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Constitutional Limitations on Closing the Gender Gap
in Employment
Marcia L. McCormick*
I. INTRODUCTION

Although discrimination on the basis of sex in employment and
education has been prohibited for over forty years, essentially two
generations, women lag behind men in workplace achievement by
almost every measure. The most prestigious and well-paying jobs continue to be held predominantly by men, and at nearly every level,
women's pay is less than men's pay. When race is also taken into account, the disparities are shocking. And at least some gap remains
when every variable but sex is controlled for. Study after study has
attempted to measure the cause of these disparities, finding some explanatory value in the number of hours worked, consistent attachment
to the workplace, and gender segregation in the labor market. These
three factors have been attributed to choices women have made, and
thus, as not a proper subject for Jaw or government programs to address. Even accounting for those factors, however, persistent pay and
achievement gaps remain that can only be explained by sex discrimination - in other words, that employers are considering sex when they
make decisions that affect hiring, promotion, or pay.
Regardless of the reasons, the legal structures we have employed
have not worked to eliminate this achievement gap. And just at a time
when we might want to consider new ways to approach it, the Supreme Court, in cases such as Ricci v. DeStefano, Dukes v. Wal-Mart,
Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, and National Federation of International Businesses v. Sebelius, is suggesting
that the Constitution may impose limits on how we might use the law
• Associate: Proressor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Kerri Stone ror
encouraging the F/U Law Review editors to invite me to participate in this symposium on the
gender gap in employment. Thanks also 10 Howard Wassennan, Mark Killenbcck, John Ho"i·
son, Michael Zimmer, Jerr Hirsch, Mork Weher, and participants at the Seventh Annual Colloquium on Labor ond Employment Law Scholarship, Northwestern University School or Law ond
Loyola University Chicago School of Law for great feedback on this topic. Finally, thanks to
John Bowen for excellent research assistance. Any errors or oversights arc: my fault entirely.
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to do so. The Court in these cases redefines discrimination, suggests
that the Equal Protection Clause may impose limits on Congress's
ability to legislate something other than traditional formal equality,
signals restrictions on judicial enforcement of constitutional and statutory rights, and suggests new limits for Congress's power under the
Spending Clause. This paper explores the ways that the Court has
slowly been retracting our ability to address the underlying causes of
the achievement gap through the law or federal programs.
Part II addresses the gender gap and summarizes the approach
federal law takes to narrow it. Part III traces the constitutional developments that have slowly eroded government's power to address inequality. Part IV identifies potential worrying trends from cases that
are not employment law cases, but which nonetheless might worry the
labor and employment community. Part V concludes this article.
II. THE GAP ANO LEGAL APPROACHES TO NARROW IT

There are many different gaps between men and women that
have remained rather persistent over time. There is a gap in pay,' in
1
workplace attainment or vertical integration within and across firms,
in wealth,' and in socio-economic status.• Congress has mainly tried to
remedy these gaps between the sexes in two ways: through antidiscrimination legislation, or through Spending Clause statutes with contract-like conditions. The best known examples of antidiscrimination
legislation include the Equal Pay Act, which prohibited sex discrimi-

l
JODY FEDER & LINDA LEVINE, CONO. RESEARCll SERV., PAY EQUITY LEGISLATION 1
(2010),availablear http:/ldigi1ak:ommons.ilr.comell.edulcgVviewcontent.cgi?aniele=l768&.conte
xt=key_workplacc (according to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2008 rull-timc working women had
a median annual salary or$ 3S,74S, while men had a median salary or S46.367).
2
Stt, e.g.• Nancy M. Carter &. Christine Silva, Women in Management: Dtlusions of Progrtss, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar. 2010, at 19 (summarizing a study or women in management and
finding that among graduates or elite MBA programs, "women continue to lag men al every
single career stage, right rrom their first prorcssional jobs").
3
See generally MARIKO LIN CHANO. SHORTCHANOED: WHY WOMEN HAVE LESS
WEALTH AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2010) (documenting the wealth gap that women
own about thiny-six cents for every dollar of wealth owned by men and exploring the causes).
4
See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, PoVERTV,AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAOE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, IS (2012), available at
http:l/www.census.gov/prodl2012pubslp60-243.pdf (reporting that women were more likely than
men to live in poverty and the difference increased with age); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTlC:S, DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN ntE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 2 (2010), available
at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlr-databook-2010.pdr (reporting that about the same number or men
and women in the labor force lived in poverty, but that women made up a significantly greater
proportion of the working poor): see also WHITE HOUSE COUNOL ON WOMEN AND GIRLS,
WOMEN IN AMERICA: INDICl\TORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING (2011 ). available at
http:Jlwww.whitehouse.govlsitesldefaultlfileslrss_viewer/Women_in_Amcrica.pdf.
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nation in pay for equal work; and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,' which prohibited discrimination in terms, conditions, and privileges of employment or classification that would tend to deprive
workers of employment opportunities on the basis of sex and other
identity characteristics.
Spending Clause statutes use contract-like conditions. For example, they require recipients of federal funds to not discriminate on the
basis of sex, or else risk losing the funds. One example of this kind of
statute in the discrimination context is the Patsy T. Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act, popularly known as Title IX, which prohibits sex discrimination and applies to educational institutions that
1
receive federal funds. Conditions are also imposed on those individuals or institutions the federal government contracts with by an
Executive Order that prohibits contractors from discriminating oa the
basis of sex." The reason that an Executive Order acts like the Spending Clause here is because the contracts are funded in the first place
through Spending Clause legislation.
These efforts have had some success, but it is not clear that they
have been responsible for narrowing the gender gaps. For example,
the pay gap in the United States was essentially unchanged for the
first twenty years after enactment of the first federal antidiscrimination statutes.' The pay gap did narrow in the 1980s and early 1990s,
0
but progress seems to have stalled since then.' The beginning of the
narrowing is not linked to any legislative or executive branch change,
and in fact occurred more than a decade after the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was given enforcement power.
Clearly, something else was at work.
Intertwined with the persistence of the gaps is broad horizontal
sex segregation in the workforce: women and men tend to do different
jobs, sometimes with differences in hours, and sometimes garnering

'

The Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 88-38, n Stal. 56 (1963) (codified as amended al 29

u.s.c §§ 206(d), 209, 211 , 213, 215-19, 255-56, 259-(i(), 262 (2006)).

6 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C
2000e lo 2000c-17 (2006)). Pans of the Civil Rights Act or 1964 rocused on entities that IC•
cepted federal funds rather than all private entities.
7
The Education Amendments or 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (t 972) (codified as
amended al 20 U.S.C §§ 1681-88 (2006)).
8
Exec. Order No. t 1246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Dec. 12, 2002). This Executive Order is
enforced by the Orfice of Federal Contract Compliance Programs.
9
See Marlt R. Killingsworth, Comparable Worth and Pay Equity: Recent Developments in
tile United States, 28 CAN. Puo.PoL'Y S171. SI 73.75 (2002).
10 Id.; see also Leslie McCall & Christine Pcrchcski, Income Inequality: New Trends and
Research Directions, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 329 (2010).
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different pay." Some pink collar jobs pay relatively well. In the professional category of the Bureau of Labor Statistics' occupational classifications, 82% of elementary and middle school teachers are women,
1
with median weekly earnings of $891.' But even within this occupa3
tional category, men have higher median wages at $1040 per week.'
Moreover, complicating this fact of horizontal sex segregation are
gendered divisions of labor within families headed by heterosexual
parent couples. When family friendly policies are introduced, they
tend to reinforce this gendered division of labor and the horizontal
sex segregation, therefore stalling progress on shrinking these gaps."
Because just using law to prohibit discrimination does not seem
to be resolving sex inequality,', we might wish to use other public policy tools to supplement that effort. However, the Supreme Court in
recent years has made that more difficult. The next section traces the
way the Court has viewed the power of government to regulate the
workplace.
Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACTION

A. First, the Expansion
Significant regulation of employment coincides generally with the
Second Industrial Revolution. At the turn of the twentieth century,
work was increasingly dangerous." Activists of this era sought to improve wages, hours, and working conditions for all workers. At first,
these activists had success with small pieces of legislation by industry,
11
sex, or age of the worker. These gains were frustrated by the Supreme Court in the now infamous case of Lochner v. New York, in
It Stt Maria Charles. A World of Dif/trtnce: lmtrnatioNJI Trtnds in Womtn s Economic
Status, 37 ANN. REV. SOC. 355 (2011); Nan Weiner, E/ftctive Rt!drtss of Pay lntquilits, 28 CAN.
Pue. POL'Y St01,S103 (2002).
12 U.S. BUREAU OF l.ADOR STATISTICS.supra note 4, at 30tbl.11, 57 tbl. 18.
ll Id. al S1 tbl. 18.
14 St!t gentra//y John M. Evans, Work/Family Rtconciliation, Gendtr Wagt Equity and
Occupational Segregation: Tht Role of Firms and Public Policy, 28 CAN. PUB. POL'Y 5187 (2002).
15 Ste Mark Cassidy et al., Gtndtr Pay Dilfertntials and Equalily Ltgislation in the Rtpub·
lie of /rtland, 28 CAN. Pua. POL'Y Sl49 (2002); Weiner,supra nole 11, at St02.QJ.
16 Ste gentrally WALTER LICHT, INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA (1995); Arthur F. McEvoy,
The Triangle Shinwaist Factory Fire of 191 I: Social Change, Industrial Accidenu, and tht Evolu·
tion of CommotUenst Causality,20 LAW& Soc. INQUIRY 621,629·30,641-43 (1995).
17 Stt ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, 0UTTO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE EARNING WOMEN
INTiiE UNITED STATES 186-99,203 (1983) (describing a number oflaws that limited the types of
jobs, number or working hours, or amount of wages for women and sometimes minors). A de·
scription of other 1ypcs or protective legislation appears in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Lochner 11. New York, 198 U.S.45 (1905). Examples are the New York sta1u1c al issue in that case
limiting hours of labor in bakeries, id. at 46, and a Utah law limiting the hours of miners, id. at
54-55.
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which the Court struck down maximum hours legislation for bakers as
a violation of the freedom to contract." The Court had previously
allowed such protections for workers in particularly dangerous occupations, but not for the average adult worker:'
The Great Depression and New Deal provided the impetus for
enacting substantially more protective labor legislation. The first such
statute was the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which provided a system for labor to bargain collectively, promoted sector-wide
bargaining, covered wages and hours, and covered working conditions
10
in some industries. The Supreme Court struck that down, in part,
because it delegated legislative authority to the Executive Branch."
Shortly after, President Roosevelt proposed expanding the size of the
22
Court to pack it with justices that supported the New Deal. That legislation was not successful, and the Court switched its position on the
strength of the freedom to contract by upholding state minimum wage
11
legislation for adults as constitutional. Additional New Deal legislation was all upheld. The Wagner Act, which later became the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), gave workers the right to bargain collectively over wages, hours, and other tenns and conditions of employment. u The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) set a minimum
wage and mandated extra pay for hours worked over a weekly threshold for many workers.is Although worker injuries were not addressed

Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45,45,57-63 (190S).
Id. at 54·55, 58-59 (noting that protections ror workers in underground mines altd smelt·
ing operations and coal workers had been upheld in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898), and
Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13 (1901), on the grounds that those occupations were
dangerous to the health or workers). The Court in Lochner suggested that the prior cases presented two justifications for the legitimate use of the police power or the state to limit the hours
or work a person could do: (1) if the members of the class suffered from a disability that made
them less able to protect their own interests; and (2) if the work to be done was unusually dangerous. Id. at 57-62. In Lochner, the Court proposed a third potential ground - injuries to the
public caused through demands on those workers. Id. at 57, 62-63.
20 The National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L.No. 73·90, 48 Stal. 195 (1933).
ll A.LA.Schechter Poultry Co. v. United Siatcs.295 U.S.495 (1935).
22 See generally MARIAN CECILIA MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND TllE GREAT
CONSTm.JTIONAL WAR:THE COURT·PACKING CRISIS OF 1937 (2002).
23 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Many historians have argued &hat &he
policy switch was made lo avoid Roosevelt's court packing plan, but others contest that a11u·
ment, arguing instead that the plan was dead before the policy switch. See Richard H. Pildes, Is
the Supreme Court a ~Majoritariat1" Institution?, 2010 Sur. CT. Rev. 103 (2011 ).
24 The National Labor Rela&ions Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-09 (2006)). The act was upheld in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Sltel
Corp., 301 U.S.1 (1937).
2S The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75·718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2006)). The Fair Labor Standards Act was upheld in Unittd
States v. Darby lumbtrCo. , 312 U.S.100 (1941).
18

19
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comprehensively by the federal government,,. most states enacted
workers' compensation systems to provide wage insurance and pay11
ment of medical bills for workers injured or killed on the job. The
federal Social Security Act created a system of retirement, unemployment insurance, and welfare benefits for poor families and people
with disabilities.•
The years surrounding World War II and the earl~ days of the
Cold War saw little legislative action on workplace laws, but the civil
rights movement and other movements for workers in the depths of
the Cold War created support for a flood of new regulation. In the
1960s and 1970s, several statutes were enacted: the Equal Pay Act,J/11
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,:u the Age Discrimination in Employment
11
Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act," Title IX, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act," the Rehabilitation Act,» and the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act." About a decade later, a new set of
workplace legislation was enacted: the Americans with Disabilities
Act" and the Family and Medical Leave Act.• Since then, there have
been some amendments to existing laws, but no new civil rights legis26 Federal law did address injuries of some employees, such as those who worked for rail·
roads or on ships. for example. Federal Employers Liability Act, ch. 149, JS SlaL 65 (1908) (codi·
r.ed as amended at 45 U.S.C. H 51-60 (2006)) (governing railroads); Merchant Marine Act of
1920,ch.250,§ 33,41 Slat. 1007 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006)).
27 E.g., N. Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW§ 13-g (McKinney 2011). New York's Workers' Com·
pcnsation Law, enacted in 1911, struck down and enacted in a slightly di£rercnt fonn in 1914, was
a product of the Wainwright Commission's findings ar1er the Triangle Shinwaist Factory fire.
PETER M. lENCSIS, WORKERS' COMPENSATION: A REFERENCE AND GUIDE 11-13 (1998). When
the Supreme Court upheld New York's law in N. Y. Ctntra/ R.R. v. Whirt, 243 U.S. 188 (1916),
along with similar laws Crom Iowa, Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917), and Washington,
Mountain limber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917), other states quickly enacted their own
such laws; rorty·lwo states by 1920, and all states by 1949. See also John Fabian Witt, Note, The
Transformation of Work and the Law of Workplace Act:idenrs, 1842-1910, 107 YALE LJ. 1467
(1998).
28 The Social Security Act, Pub. L No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34 (2006)). The Supreme Court upheld the Social Security Act in a series of
cases: Helvcring v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (interpreting the general welfare spending clause);
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (concerning unemployment insurance); Carmichael v. S. Coal&. Coke Co.,301 U.S.495 (1937) (involving unemployment insurance).
29 One notable exception was the Tart-Hartley amendments 10 the National Labor Relations Act, applying new rules to unions. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101,61
Stal 136 (1947).
30 The Equal Pay Act ort963, Pub. L No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963).
31 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L No.88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
l2 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act oft967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. <i02.
33 The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590.
34 The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of l 972, Pub. L. No. 92·261, 86 Stat. 103.
JS The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355.
36 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-SSS, 92 Stat. 2076.
37 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327.
3& The Family and Medical l..cavc Act of 1993, Puh L. No. l 03-3, I 07 Slat. 6.
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lation.,. The biggest workplace development has come through the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act• and the Dodd-Frank
1
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.•
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the most sweeping of these Acts,
was challenged on the grounds that Congress could not require private parties to stop discriminating. The challengers focused on the
public accommodations provisions and claimed that the statute exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause power and deprived them of
4
liberty and property without due process. The Court rejected that
claim in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, holding that the
Commerce Clause empowered Congress to prohibit private race discrimination." After Heart ofAtlanta Motel, Congress's power to enact
Title VII was mostly settled, although its reach and the antidiscrimination principle embodied by the Equal Protection Clause
were litigated." There was no hint at that time that prohibiting discriminatory effects would pose a constitutional problem, and in fact,
the Court seemingly approved of such a rule, but thought Congress
should be the body to create it: "extension of the [disparate impact]
rule beyond those areas where it is already applicable by reason of
39 Congress extended family and medical leave to members or the military and their fami·
lies and to night crews. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20IO, Pub. L. No.
111-84, § 565, 123 SlaL 2190, 2309 (2009). It also provided whistlcblower protections for employ·
ees reponing fraud in the financial sector. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act or 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1553, 123 Stat. 115, 297·302 (providing whistleblowcr protection and prohibiting mandatory employment arbitration provisions). Finally, it amended Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act to clariry that pay discrimination oocurs with each paycheck that provides less pay on
the basis or sex. Ully Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No: 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5 (2009)
(codiried at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S (Supp. 1112009)).
40 Congress required larger employers to provide arrordable health insurance for employ·
ees or pay a tax, created incentives for smaller employers to provide health insurance, and also
mandated breaks and facilities ror lactating women to express milk. Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124Stat. l19 (2010).
•t Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§
748, 922·24, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739-46, 1841·50 (2010).
-42 Heart or Atlanla Motel v. United States.379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).
•3 Id. at 257·S8, 261 (considering a challenge to lite public accommodations provision of
the Civil Rights Act or 1964).
"" One big question was whether state action that hod discriminDtory errects (rather than
that taken with intent to discriminate) was prohibited by the Equal Protection Oausc. Most
courts answered in the arfirmative, but the Supreme Coun rejected that possibility. See Washing·
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243-45 (1976) (detailing Supreme Court aiscs that seemed to recognize
that and the extent or agreement among the courts of appeals). Justice Stevens. concurring, did
suggest that discriminatory impact might sometimes show a violation o( equal protection, not
because it clearly showed a subjective motivation, but because people are presumed to intend
the natural consequcn«s of their actions. Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Pers. Adm'r
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (despite usual rule of intending natural consequences, no
evidence that veteran's preference was iidopted because it kept women out of positions); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, l 18 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that discriminalory purpose could be inrerrcd from
denial or pcnnit to all Chinese applicants and grant to about 98% of non-Chinese applicants).
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statute, such as in the field of public employment, should await legislative prescription.''.,
B. The Contraction
Even as Congress was expanding rights through statutes, the
Court began to limit Congress's power to do so. Limits began with the
Tenth Amendment in National League of Cities v. Usery,.. which concerned the application of the FLSA's minimum wage and maximum
hours rules to state and local governments. The Court analyzed the
issue as a clash between Congress's Commerce Clause power and the
right states have to continue to exist as sovereigns, which is a right
recognized by the Tenth Amendment." The National League of Cities
test proved unworkable, and the Court overruled it in 1985 in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.• But only a few years
after Garcia, the Court began to strengthen the Tenth Amendment
again, holding that it prohibited a federal court from ordering a state
to raise property taxes to adequately fund a school system as a remedy for discrimination the school district had engaged in ... The principle was further developed to prohibit Congress from coercing state
governments into either accepting ownership of radioactive waste or

Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
Nat'I League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
47 Id. at 840-52. The Coun refined the test for when federal statutes would violate the
Tenth Amendment in Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining&. Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
The federal statute at issue must regulate "lhe Stales as States," it must regulate what are clearly
"allribute[s] or state sovereignly," state compliance with the federal statute must " directly impair
(the States') ability 'to structure integral operations in areas or traditional governmental functions,'" and the federal interest ut stake must not be one that "justifies state submission." Hodel,
452 U.S. at 287-88, & n.29 (quoting Nat'I League of Citits, 426 U.S. at 845, 852, 854) .
.411 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Because the nature of
government had changed in the coune or hislory, relying on hislory and tradition lo delineate
the boundaries of the rule provided ll moving target. Id. at 543-45. And state government
should be allowed lo change within the limits of the U.S. Constitulion in order to muimize the
power or state citizens to shape the form of their government through the political process. Id. at
545-46. Finally, the Court theorized that the stales had adequate structural protection from
congressional overreaching as evidenced by the fact that the states remained immune from
obligations under a number of federal statutes and lhe fact that the states had secured compensation in the form of federal funding ror many programs at the same time any obligations were
imposed. Id. at 552·55. Thus, both pragmatism and redcralism required that National league of
Cities be overruled.
49 Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). The Court rurther held that a federal court could
have allowed or required the school district to levy property taxes at a rate adequate to fund the
desegregation remedy, and it could have enjoined the operation of state laws that would have
prevented the district from exercising this power. The distinction between what was prohibited
and allowed may seem a fine one.
45

46
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implementing legislation dictated by Congress.JO and to prohibit Congress from requiring local law enforcement to conduct background
checks on applicants for gun permits." This anti-commandeering principle was seen as a way to protect the political system: if average people could not tell what government was responsible for legislation
they either liked or disliked, they would not be able to engage the
right political system to respond.n
The Court also limited Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause during this period. In 1995, the Court struck down legislation
as beyond Congress's Commerce Clause power in United States v. Lopez, which concerned a statute that made possession of a firearm in a
school zone a federal crime." The Court found that criminalizing gun
possession near schools was not regulation of any sort of economic
activity, nor did gun possession in a school zone, by itself, substantially
affect interstate commerce.so Following Lopez, the Court struck down
the civil remedy in the Violence Against Women Act, holding that
gender-motivated violence was neither economic activi~ itself, nor did
such violence substantially affect interstate commerce. After Morrison, in Gonzales v. Raich,,. the Court upheld the federal Controlled
Substances Act" as valid Commerce Clause legislation that preempted
a California law which had allowed individuals to grow small amounts
of marijuana for their own use when a doctor recommended the drug
11
for serious medical conditions.
The Court avoided the federalism issue entirely in a case involving the executive branch's attempts to preempt an Oregon law that
allowed doctors to prescribe drugs to help terminally ill patients
commit suicide,,. by finding that Congress failed to give the executive

SO New York v. Unilcd States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992) (prohibiting Congress from re·
quiring slate governments to accept ownership or radioactive waste or implement legislation
dictated by Congress).
51 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-33 (1997) (prohibiting Congress from comman·
deering local law enforcement).
S2 Ste Ntw York, SOS U.S. at 168-69.
SJ United States v. Lopcz,514 U.S. 549, SSl (1995) (considering the Oun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45 (1990), suptrseckd by statute,
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103·322, § 320904, 108
Stat. 1796, 2125-26 (1994); stt Erwin Chcmcrinsky, Tht Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L REV.
1, 2·3 (2004).
S4 lopt:, 514 U.S. at 561-68.
55 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (considering the Violence against Women
Act of1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, !I 40302, 108 Stat. 1902, 1941-42 (1994)).
56 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12·22 (2005).
S7 21 u.s.c. H 801-904 (2006).
58 CAL HEALTH AND SAFETI' CODE§ l 1362.5 (West 2012).
59 OR.REV.STAT. ANN. §§ l27.800-.897(Wcst 1998).
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branch the power to prohibit doctors from prescribing these drugs.""
Most recently, though, the Court held that Congress lacked power
under the Commerce Clause to mandate that individuals buy health
insurance, rejecting the government's argument that health care was a
market everyone participated in already."
Despite Raich, when taken together, these cases make fairly clear
that the Commerce Clause can only reach commercial activity or activity that relates to goods or services that might travel in commerce.
To the extent that the gender pay gap is caused at least in part by gender segregation in the labor force, and that gender segregation depends in part on constraints related to family, the Commerce Clause
may not provide a source of power to remedy it. In other words, the
Commerce Oause may not support legislation that relates to family
relationships and the division of caregiving responsibilities.
In addition to the Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause contexts, the Court has put limits on the power of Congress, the Executive
Branch, and the states under the Equal Protection principles of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In the 1980s and 1990s, the limits
began in the context of affirmative action. Through a series of cases,
the Court held that any consideration of race, even to benefit historically disadvantaged groups, received the same scrutiny as considerations to harm those groups.u
This shift to limit Congress's power was invigorated in 1996 in a
series of cases on the Eleventh Amendment. In Seminole Tribe v.
Florida," the Court held that Congress could not subject the states to
suits by private parties when it acted under its Commerce Clause
power, but could only do so under its Fourteenth Amendment pow-

Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257-69 (2006).
Nat'I Fed. of lndep. Bus. v. Scbclius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
62 The series began with Wygant"· Jackson Bd of Educ.,416 U.S. 267,273-74 (1986) (plurality op.); id. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring in port and concurring in the judgment); id. at 295
(White, J., concurring in the judgment only). In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Ca, the Cour1
struck down an affirmative action plan the city was requiring ilS contractors to agree to that
involved minority set-asides for subcontractors, and a majority of justices finally agreed that
strict scrutiny should apply. 488 U.S. 469, 493, 508 (1989); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring). The
plurality rested ilS decision in pan on the fact that a city council lacked the powers expressly
given to Congress in the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the equal protection guarantees. Id
at 488, 490. In Adorand Corutruct0'1, Inc. v. P~na, the Court held that the Firth Amendment's
equal protection guarantee should be made identical to the Fourteenth Amendment's. 515 U.S.
200,227 (1995) (overruling Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC,497 U.S.547 (1990)).
6J 517 U.S. 44 (1996). The plain language of the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits "in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
Stale, or ... of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend XI. In Haru v. Louisiana, 10 S. Ct. 504
(1890), the Court read more into that language, holding that it prohibited suilS in federal courts
not only by citizens of foreign states but also by a citizen against his or her own state.
liO

6t

2013]

Constitutional limitations on Closing the Gender Gap

415

ers." The result in Seminole Tribe left intact a decision that had upheld
litle vn·s prohibition on disparate treatment as validly within the
65
Court's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. But Congress•s power under the Fourteenth Amendment became more important the year after the Seminole Tribe decision with City of Boerne v.
Flores ... which held that Congress could not statutorily expand rights
founded in the Constitution beyond what the Court had declared
them to be. nor could it create remedies out of proportion to a dem1
onstrated record of Fourteenth Amendment violations.'
After City of Boerne, the Court invalidated Congress's attempt to
make states liable for damages in a number of statutes, holding that
they did not enforce the Fourteenth Amendment... 1\vo of these were
employment discrimination laws. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents." the Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment
10
Act was neither congruent nor proportional to any documented pattern of constitutional violations by states;" it held the same thing for
11
litle I of the Americans with Disabilities Act in Board of Trustees v.
Garrett.n While the Court upheld the family leave provisions of the
Family and Medical Leave Act as properly enforcing the Fourteenth
64 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59-&S (1996). The Court revised that limitation in
two bankruptcy case5, Central Virginia Community Colltge "· Kati and Ttnntssee Student Assis·
tanct Corp. v. Hood, holding that Congress could subject the state to suit in bankruptcy proceed·
ings under its Artide I bankruptcy powe~ Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 373.79
(2006); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 446-51 (2004).
6S Fitzpatriclc v. Oitzer,427 U.S. 44.5,453-56(1976).
66 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (199'7).
67 Id. at 517, 519·20, 536 (holding that, while Congress has broad authority under the
Constitution to adopt legislation to protect Fourteenth Amendment righ&s, the Court retains the
right to detenninc whether such legislation amounts to an abuse of authority under the Constitu·
tion).
68 For instana:, in Florida Prepaid Poststcondary Education &. Expense Board v. Colltgt
Savings Bank, Sri U.S. 627 (1999), and Colltgt Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Poststcondary
Education cl Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999), the Court held that lhe Patent and rlant Vari·
ety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992), and the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1114, 1122, 1125, 1127 (1994), were not
valid enactments under the Fourteenth Amendment. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. &. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 647 (involving the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarifica.
lion Act); Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 690-91 (involving the Trademark Remedy Oarilication
Act).
fll Kimel v. Fla. Od. of Regen&s, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
70 29
§§ 621 ·34 (2006).
71 Kimel,528 U.S. at 63.
n 42
§§ 12111 ·117 (2006).
73 Od. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001 ). The Court upheld 1ille II of the
ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-65 (2006), which requires government bodies to provide acxcss to
government buildings and services to those with disabilities, al least in cases where the plaintiff
was denied access to the couns or suffered cruel and unusual punishment, both constitutional
violations in their own right. Tennessee v. Lane, S41 U.S. 509, 509-10, 51S,523 (2004).

u.s.c.
u.s.c.
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Amendment, ' it held that the self-care provisions did not enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment.,,
Outside of the intersection of the Fourteenth and Eleventh
Amendments, the Court has also taken a restrictive view of federal
10
power in other civil rights contexts: habeas corpus jurisdiction, voting
11
rights cases, and implied rights of action directly under the Constitution."' The Court also seems to have narrowed the definition of discrimination, diminishing the possibility of using the disparate impact
theory under Title VII,,, and rejecting the possibility that evidence of
implicit biases could be evidence of either disparate impact or dispa.
rate treatment.•
IV. THE NEWESTTRENDS -CUTIING OFF HOPE ENTIRELY?

In addition to these trends, even more troubling trends are suggested by what the Court is not addressing in some of its decisions and
what individual justices are saying in concurrences and dissents. This
section explores some of those trends.
The Court's decision in Ricci v. DeStefano.. is one such case. At
issue in Ricci was whether a city government's rejection of results
from a test for promotion that caused a disparate impact on firefighters of color was disparate treatment, and if so, whether the city could
defend its actions on the grounds that it was avoiding liability for the
disparate impact.a Because the employer was a city government, the
Equal Protection clause also applied to it, and the firefighters who
14 Nev. Ocp't of Human Serv~ v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 722-24 (2003).
1s Coleman v. CL App. Md., 132 S. CL 1327, 1333-37 (2012). Justice Scalia, concurring.
would have held that outside or race, Congress's enforcement power is limited to regulating
conduct that itsclr violates the Founccnth AmendmenL Id. at 1338 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer would overrule Stminole Tribe and hold that Congress may validly
abrogate state immunity rrom suit under its Commerce Clause powen. Id. at 1339 & n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
76 E.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318 (1995) (expressing concern that habeas filings
threatened the finality or state coun judgments. implicating comity and redcralism), superseded
by srarure, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255 (2006).
11 E.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Od., 520 U.S. 471, 476-85 (1996) (holding that prcclcarance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Actor 1965,42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994),cannot be denied
simply because a jurisdiction's voting procedures violate Section 2 of the Act, id. § 1973); Growe
v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (recognizing that, even though (cdcral and state courts may
have concurrent jurisdiction over panicular subject matter, there arc circumstances in which
federalism and comity concerns dictate redcral abstention). But see Dush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,
1069 (1996) (5-4 decision) (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality opinion for going too
far in limiting state discretion under the Voting Rights Act).
78 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. <J62, 678, 68().82 (2009).
79 Ricci v. Destefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
80 Ste Wal-Man Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131S.Ct.2541,2553-55 (2011).
81 Ricci, 551 U.S. at 557.
82 Id. at 578-81.
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sued the city argued that rejecting the results violated both 1itle VII
11
and the Equal Protection clause. The majority found that the city's
rejection of the results was disparate treatment underlit1e VII, declining to reach the equal protection issue."'
Justice Scalia concurred that the City of New Haven's decision to
not certify a promotion list was because of the race of the successful
applicants, but he wrote separately to say that he believed the Court
would have to decide one day whether the disparate impact provisions
of litle VII violate equal protection." litle VII prohibits employers
from using neutral practices that have a disparate impact on members
of a protected group unless those practices are job related and consistent with business necessity.• To comply with the prohibition on disparate impact, employers have to look at the race, sex, or other identity characteristics of the members of its work force and compare the
proportions of each group to their proportions in the labor pool."
They must consider the race of employees and take particular actions
because of the race of successful candidates.• Additionally, the duty to
act based on the protected class of the employees does not depend on
prior discrimination by that employer the way that it might under the
Equal Protection clause."
Asking whether there has been a disparate impact and rejecting
the neutral practice that produced it, in Justice Scalia's view, was a
consideration of protected class in which the federal government
would not be able to engage while remaining consistent with the equal
protection principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment.• And if
Congress cannot do it, Congress should not be able to require private
employers to do it. Justice Scalia did not bring up the issue in the next
case to present a disparate impact claim, this one in the private sector;
in •fact.
he
did not address that theory of discrimination at all in his
•
ti
optmon.
Stt:id. Ill 561-63, 576·77,592-93.
Id. at 576-77,592·93.
as Id. at 594-95 (Scalia, J., concurring).
86 Stt42 U.S.C § 2000c-2(h) (2006).
81 Ste Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (recognizing the disparate impact
cause or action): see auo Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (relining the
calculations in light of the relevant labor pool), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated
in Wal-Man Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. a .2541, 2555 (2011 ).
88 Ste 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(k) (2006) (defining the burden of proof in disparate impact cases
and m11king clear that the employer will be liable if the challenged practice causes a disparate
impact but is not consistent with a business necessity).
89 E.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (recognizing that remedying past
discrimination was a compelling governmental interest).
90 Ricci v. DeStefano. 557 U.S. 594-95 (2009).
91
Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. a .2541, 2552-57 (201 I).
83
84
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That case, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, had other troubling aspects. The
case involved whether all of the women who had worked for WalMart since 1998 could proceed as a class in a case involving sex discrimination in pay and promotions." The class certification was overturned as not satisfying the class action rules... Along the way, Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected social science evidence on
how implicit biases could infect a corporate culture and promote discriminatory sex stereotyping. He found the claim that people tend to
make choices infected by stereotypes not believable based on how he
believed people would act." In essence, Justice Scalia seems to have
held that employers will be liable for discrimination only when their
agents are motivated to treat employees in a particular way because
the employees are members of a protected class, and those agents
fully realize that this is their motivation." Ricci and Wal-Mart suggest
that Congress cannot prohibit inequitable effects.
Justice Scalia is not the only Justice who is skeptical that discrimination still exists and of Congress's ability to enact prophylactic
rules that grant rights greater than what the Constitution provides.
Justice Thomas, too, is skeptical. He would have held that the preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act exceeded Congress's
power in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v.
Holder.n The majority avoided deciding the issue; but it is back at the
Supreme Court in the current term."
With every contraction of rights by the Court, scholars and activists retrenched at two safety nets: the Ex Parte Young doctrine,100 and
101
the Spending Clause. First, let me explain the Ex Parle Young safety
Id.

92
93
94

Id. at 255~7.

9S

Id. at 2553-55.

Id.

96 Ste Marcia L. McConnick, Implausible Injuries: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and the Future of
Class Actions and Employment Discrimination Cases, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1401 (2013).
'T1 557 U.S. 193, 215-82 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
amendment al issue was lhe Fifteenth, which specifically concerns voting.
98 Id. at 201-06.
99 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-06. Justice Scalia demonstrated his skepticism aboul the
validity of this part of the Voting Rights Act, calling it a "racial cnlitlcment." Oral Argument
Transcript, at 47, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-06 (Feb. 27,2013). At lhc time this article went to
press. the third week in June, the Court had still not issued its decision in the case.
IQO Ste, e.g., Rochelle Bobrofr, Ex Pa rte Young as a Tool to En/orce Sa/ety-Net and CivilRighu Statutes, 40 U. TOLL. REV.819 (2009); Bruce E. O'Connor&. Emily C. Peyser, Ex Partc
Young: A Mtclumism for Enforcing Federal Intellectual Property RighlS against States, 10 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 225 (2004).
101 Ste, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Congress is free to amend lhe interim program to provide for its continuance on a contractual
basis with the States if it wishes."); New York v. United Slates,505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
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net. When the Court said that states could not be sued for damages
under statutes that Congress created, it removed only that remedy.
The states still had to comply with the statutes as long as they were
valid commerce clause legislation. And the way that individuals could
force compliance was by bringing an action against a state actor seeking prospective relief for the state to comply with the statute in the
future. Under Ex Parte Young, such an action is not viewed as a suit
against the state, which would be barred by sovereign immunity:m
Now, let me explain why the Spending Clause seemed to provide some
relief. Because Congress had more power to spend federal money for
the general welfare than it had even to regulate under the Commerce
Clause, it could impose conditions - like complying with antidiscrimination laws or even engaging in affirmative action - on those
funds before they were accepted as long as those conditions were not
1
coercive. m However, two additional cases from the Court's 2012 term
suggest that these safety nets are in danger, as well.
In Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California,
the Supreme Court had to decide whether a private action could be
brought against state officials directly under the Supremacy Clause
1
The majority
using the Ex Parte Young implied right of action.
1
dodged the question,'°' but four justices would have said 00. °" Those
dissenters would have limited Ex Parte Young even more fundamentally to essentially not apply to spending clause legislation at all, and
to rarely apply to commerce clause legislation unless it provided a
private right of action explicitly.'°' If this view were to command a
majority of the Court, it is possible that the Spending Clause will become Jess available, and it may also signal that the Court will limit Ex
Parte Young in other ways.
The Court has limited the doctrine before. It was refined in
Edelman v. Jordan, in which the Court held that the exception to state
immunity only applied when plaintiffs were seeking prospective relief.11111 In a later case, the Court held that the federal courts may not
hear claims for relief based on alleged violations of state law,'°' and
209 U.S.123 (1908).
See New York v. United States. SOS U.S. 144, 167 (1992); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203, 206 (1987).
104 132 s. Ct. 1204 (2012).
IOS Id. at 1210-11 .
106 See id. at 1211·15 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
107 See id.; see also Stephen I. Vladc:ck, Douglas and the Fate of Ex Pane Young, 122 YALE
LJ. ONLINE 13 (2012), available at http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/the·yale·law·joumal·pocketpart/suprcmc-cour1/douglas·and·the·fate.of-ex-parte·youngl.
108 415 U.S.651 (1974).
109 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
102
103
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may not exercise jurisdiction when Congress has created an extensive
alternative enforcement scheme.'.. Finally, the doctrine cannot be
used to sue state officials to quiet title to lands possibly within the territory of the state."' This latest round in the Ex Parte Young line of
cases suggests that the Court may be likely to impose even more
stringent limitations in the future.
In National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebe/ius,m the
Court also suggested that new limits to Congress's power under the
Spending Clause may be in the works. The Court held that the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act's expansion of Medicaid was too
10
coercive to be within Congress's Spending Clause powers. While
Justice Roberts appeared to agree that Congress could have repealed
Medicaid and replaced it with a different program that accomplished
the Medicaid expansion, he rejected the significance of that fact:
[I]t would certainly not be that easy. Practical constraints would
plainly inhibit, if not preclude, the Federal Government from repealing the existing program and putting every feature of Medicaid on the table for political reconsideration. Such a massive
11
undertaking would hardly be "ritualistic." '
Justice Roberts' opinion seems to have implicitly accepted that
Congress could, alternatively, create a wholly federal program under
the Spending Clause, but it also implied that Congress could not repeal Medicaid unless it was going to replace it with a federal program.'11 If the Court is set to reign in Congress's powers under the
Spending Clause, many important workplace programs might be in

110 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996). In an analogous case, the Court has
held that 42 U.S.C § 1983 cannot be used to sue state actors for violations of statutes that contain
comprehensive enforcement schemes. See Middlesex Cty. Sewage Authority v. Nat'I Sea Oam·
mers Ass'n,453 U.S. 1 (1981).
m Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 , 287 (1997) (concerning the title to submerged lands). This may be a very narrow exception applicable only to disputes between stales
and Indian tribes over the territorial boundaries of both. This con1cx1 is one of the few land
disputes that could raise a federal question, namely where land was reserved through a federal
treaty with a tribe.
112 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
113 Id. at 2633-39 (Roberts, CJ.). Only Justices Breyer and Kagan joined in this part of the
opinion. Ordinarily, the opinion of three Justices within a majority would not be controlling.
However, once the four Justices who dissented entirely arc counted, there are seven Justices who
believed that the Medicaid expansion was uncomtitutional for one reason or anocher. Id. at
2656-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Convc~ly, only two Justices believed that the Medicaid expan·
sion was constitutional. Id. at 2009, 2629-42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
114 Id. at 2606 n.14 (Roberts, CJ.).
115 Stt id. at 2661-66 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing lhc scope of the Medicaid program
and states' reliance on it).
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danger, and Congress's toolbox to address the gender gap will be
much more poorly equipped.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GENDER GAP

The actual and potential limitations discussed in the preceding
section pose especially serious problems for addressing the gender gap
through law. Research has demonstrated that antidiscrimination provisions and family friendly policies cannot reduce the gap significantly
by themselves: they fall victim to the equal rights/special rights problem."' Formal equality principles, equality of rights or equal opportunity, have not been successful because men and women are not considered to be the same, either because of biological differences or because of how people are acculturated to perform their gender. Overall, we have not progressed very far in addressing inequality in contexts where we think people are different.
In the law, formal equality or equal rights usually refers either to
the absence of classification or to a mandate not to classify on the basis of membership in a particular group. Formal equality is focused on
the individual rather than on the group that the individual may be a
member of. Fonnal equality is nothing more or less than the Aristotelian principle that likes should be treated alike while those who are
not alike should be treated differently. An alternate approach to
equality is substantive equality or equality of outcomes or results.
Substantive equality generally refers to equality in the distribution of
goods, resources, and power, and is often described as embodying an
anti-subordination principle. This anti-subordination principle provides that actions enforcing the inferior status of historically oppressed groups should be prohibited.
The formal equality approach, at least to some extent, retains historical inequities. It prohibits different pay within an occupation if
that difference is because of the sex of the worker, but it accepts just
about any other reason for that difference in pay, without requiring
the employer to justify its reason. It accepts that all nurses should be
paid the same basic wage, but accepts that firefighters should be paid
more. To the extent that the gender gap is caused by occupational
segregation, by choices and human capital investments that women
make, or by cognitive biases of employers or women themselves, as
long as Congress's power is limited to the tools of formal equality,
there seems little Congressional power that can reach the gap.
116 Su, e.g., Evans. supra note 14 (describing how work/family reconciliation policies - lea vc
policies - exacerbated gender segregation in the labor market and a pay and promotions gap;
and summarizing prior research reaching the same conclusions).
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Formal equality tends to view social goods as fixed resources in a
closed system. In a closed system with scarce resources, every allocation decision is a zero-sum game. To give to one person is to take
away from another, and when group identity status is mixed in, things
get more complicated. Giving something to women looks like taking
something away from men. The distribution of resources and social
goods appears natural, and advantages are invisible, at least to those
who have them. Even small changes in how resources should be allocated may look like they injure "rights" of members of the dominant
group.
The one power that may be left open to Congress, the one power
we actually use to redistribute wealth and income, seems to be the
11
taxing power. ' And so maybe this is the direction we should begin to
focus on. Perhaps we could tax occupations at different rates, creating
a tax incentive for people who work in fields that are integrated or
that are dominated by members of another sex. Maybe we could tie
corporate income tax rates to the level of vertical integration in a firm
or the integration of its workforce across jobs. Perhaps investment
income from companies that have integrated across job categories
could.be taxed at a lower rate than income from companies that have
not. Maybe we could provide other tax-expenditure incentives for
employers that could reduce either occupational segregation or the
lower pay linked with pink collar jobs. There may be very good policy
reasons not to use the taxing power in this way, reasonable minds can
differ. But if the only power left open for government to take a role in
promoting equality is the taxing power, perhaps we should explore it;
that may be our future.

117 At least one other scholar has come to the same conclusion. Linda Sugin, Thi! Great
and Mighty Ta.r Law: How tht! Robens Court Has Rtduct!d Corutitutional Scrutiny of Ta.res and
Ta.r Ezptnditurts (unpublished manuscript 2012), avai/ablt at http://papcrs.ssm.com/
sol3/papcrs.cfm?abstract_id• 2183278.

